Why the United States Must Solve the Tactical Problem

World War One repeated

March 1918

The German Empire launched their Spring Offensive with “Operation Michael” in March of 1918. This operation was accompanied by one of the most detailed artillery plans in military history, and this support as well as their Stormtrooper tactics provided the Germans with one of the largest breakthroughs since the war had become positional. The Germans’ plan demonstrated not only their tactical prowess at the small-unit level, but also their understanding of the importance of depth at the operational level.

Within the first day the German army had overrun significant sections of the British line, capturing many artillery pieces and coming within kilometers of key British logistics stockpiles. The British withdrawal was uncoordinated and allowed the Germans to make progress even in areas which had not seen an initial breakthrough. The situation was so dire in fact that the French government had considerations for abandoning Paris if things worsened, (the second time in the war).

However, this was 1918. The German Empire was stretched to its breaking point logistically, and many of its troops were conscripts who would barely have qualified for military service in peacetime. Many of the horses needed to move artillery and supplies were in similarly poor shape. Rations were scarce even in the homeland, let alone on the front.

The Germans’ elite assault divisions quickly outran their logistics and even other German infantry. In order to remedy this issue, the Germans had to pull back to begin reconsolidating their defense closer to their railheads, sacrificing significant gains in order to avoid losing all of the territory taken. This was not enough, and the Allied counter-offensive was strong enough that by its winding down in Autumn, the German imperial court was ready to throw in the towel.

Lessons Learned

The German Empire of Spring 1918 had learned how to operate on the modern battlefield. No longer were German troops marching in columns which would have been recognizable by Napoleon, their units were organized in an Order of Battle much more similar to those used by armies today. The plan for Operation Michael demonstrated that the Germans had solved the tactical problems of the First World War, but did not have the logistics or reserves to carry on. The Allies, on the other hand, did have both the logistics network and reserves to back up their gains, even if these were often more limited. When both sides of the war could confidently make tactical breakthroughs, the war became one of pure attrition: whoever could outlast the other would be the victor. The frontline on armistice day was in Belgium, not Germany.

A very similar series of events played out in World War Two. The Wehrmacht was arguably the most tactically effective military of the war, with years of firsthand experience in maneuver warfare. Despite this, Germany still found herself conscripting Hitler Youth members and veterans of the last war to fill a manpower deficit, and enduring a famine during a war once again. The Pacific theater was much the same: the Japanese army was adept at fighting in the tropical jungles throughout the South Pacific, but could barely feed the troops which were stationed there. When Germany launched Operation Watch on the Rhine, it did so for many of the same reasons as it launched Operation Michael, with much similar effects.

Modern Application

The United States has traditionally enjoyed a logistical superiority over its enemies. In both world wars it found itself better equipped and with deeper reserves of manpower than its opponents, not to mention entering both wars late. The U.S. has also had a much better, (or at least larger), manufacturing sector than its opponents in these conflicts. The same could be said about many of the smaller conflicts that the U.S. has been involved in since 1945.

If the U.S. finds herself in another conventional war, (as I believe it will), the opposite will be the case. The U.S. will have the smaller manufacturing sector, smaller reserves of manpower and significantly reduced ammunition stockpiles in comparison to its most likely foes: Russia and/or China.

This should, of course, be a cause for concern on its own. Military thinkers should obviously be concerned with remedying all of these problems. However, I don’t think that we will be able to solve them in time. As such, we must also be looking at this from a different viewpoint: the German one.

The German Empire and the Third Reich both knew in advance that they had a serious attritional disadvantage. To compensate for this disadvantage, they both tried to end their respective conflicts quickly with decisive maneuvers. When this failed, they resorted to a series of desperate attempts to destroy Allied armies in the field. There is, however, a crucial difference between the Germans and the current American position: location. The Americans cannot be blockaded or even besieged by either of their rivals, therefore time itself is not a threat. Attrition is. This leaves us with an American plan which should look something like this:

America should firstly aim for rapid destruction of enemy capability before the enemy’s logistical strength is even at play. Forcing the enemy to fight in situations where the United States is stronger, (on narrow fronts, coastal terrain or far from his homeland), rather than allowing him to choose the location is mandatory. The moment that the war does become attritional, the United States should seek an exit: it cannot win in this type of conflict.

America’s strength is in its ability to maneuver, particularly at the strategic level. The United States can rapidly redeploy massive swaths of its military, (albeit not as rapidly as it tells itself). Within days of a conflict beginning, the U.S. can send fully equipped combined arms units to the area. This provides the U.S. with huge advantages in the opening stages of a conflict, advantages which cease to maintain their importance the longer a conflict lasts.

In order to maintain the U.S.’ advantages, we must solve the tactical problems presented by modern warfare now, much as the Third Reich created a well-functioning mobile force before the war began. We cannot afford to enter a war in which we are not only in a logistical deficit, but also a tactical one. The Russian army has demonstrated that it can conduct fairly large breakthroughs even in today’s ISR dominated battlefield, and the Chinese North Korean allies have gained firsthand advisory experience, (as well as the Chinese themselves to a lesser degree). The U.S. must rapidly learn how to maneuver and win in today’s conditions. She cannot win another way.

I promise I’ll be writing about politics again soon.